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Abstract: Ibn Khaldun and Thomas Hobbes both present the pre-political state as characterized 
by intolerable violence, and view the establishment of a strong political authority as the best hope 
of stability. Yet they differ in tracing the origin of this authority. For Hobbes, sovereignty arises 
due to universal consent and agreement inspired by a collective desire for peace, while for Ibn 
Khaldun it is consolidated only through the overwhelming power of a tribal feeling known as 
asabiyya. Modern politics inevitably combines the emphasis on popular consent and law so 
characteristic of Hobbes, and the tribal feeling, patronage, and special interests so characteristic 
of Ibn Khaldun. 
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Öz: İbn Haldun ve Thomas Hobbes siyaset kurumu öncesi durumu tolere edilemez cebir ile tasvir 
etmekte ve sağlam bir siyasi otoritenin kurulmasını istikrar için en önemli umut olarak 
görmektedir. Ne var ki, bu otoritenin kaynağını tespit noktasında ikisi ayrılmaktadır. Hobbes 
açısından egemenlik, toplu bir barış arzusundan ilham alan umumi bir rıza ve muvafakat ile ortaya 
çıkarken; İbn Haldun, bunun ancak “asabiyya” olarak bilinen, kapsamlı bir kavmiyet duygusundan 
gücünü alarak pekiştiğini söylemektedir. Modern siyaset, yaygın rıza ve hukuka vurgu yapan 
Hobbes’un yaklaşımını, kavmiyet  duygusu, himaye ve özel çıkarlara vurgu yapan İbn Haldun’un 
yaklaşımı ile kaçınılmaz olarak birleştirmektedir. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Siyaset, Kraliyet otoritesi, Aṣabiyya, Hakimiyet, Rıza 
 
1. Introduction 
The field of Comparative Political Theory has become so fashionable in North America 
that universities now advertise jobs reserved exclusively to it. Scholars such as Farah 
Godrej, Fred Dallmayr, and Roxanne Euben have each produced books explaining the 
theories, methods, and objectives behind the new field in copious, up-to-date 
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terminology. Given the global, multicultural sphere in which so many contemporary 
events and conferences take place, this is a necessary and encouraging development. 
What seems less common, as far as I can discern, are detailed studies comparing the 
greatest classics of Western and non-Western thought.1 The obstacles to this kind of 
scholarship are twofold. First, it can be difficult to compare thinkers that never had any 
contact, first or even second-hand, with one another, and who wrote in hermetically 
separate cultures and milieus. Second, the required amount of scholarly preparation, 
including the mastery of two distinct languages and cultures, can seem daunting. 
  
The comparison I propose, between Thomas Hobbes and Ibn Khaldun, is hardly immune 
to these challenges. The physical lives of the two men were separated by more than 250 
years, two thousand kilometers, and two oceans, yet one feels that these numbers do 
not begin to fathom the vast distance between them. Each wrote in the context of his 
own distinct religion and civilization, which were generally hostile to each other. Each 
was a masterful stylist in his respective language, but these languages had almost no 
mutual contact or shared vocabulary. It goes without saying that neither author was 
familiar with the other’s work. Far from fully meeting these challenges, this article should 
only be viewed as a small first step in a larger project. It will suffice, I hope, to 
demonstrate its long-term potential. 
 
In perusing Hobbes’ Leviathan and Ibn Khaldun’s Muqaddima, one notices striking 
similarities in their general understanding of politics that echo across the cultural and 
historical divide, and should more than justify a comparison between them. Both 
thinkers argue forcefully for a strong, even despotic, political authority, as the only way 
to escape the perils and insecurity of our pre-political state. This is the crucial point of 
agreement around which my comparison turns. At the same time, their respective 
descriptions of both the intolerable pre-political state and the effective political 
authority that overcomes it diverge considerably. My purpose here is to compare Hobbes 
with Ibn Khaldun on these points, and then briefly argue for the enduring significance 
                                                 
1 Of the three authors mentioned above, Roxanne Euben is the most exegetical. Her influential Journeys to the 
Other Shore contains substantial discussions of Herodotus, Montesquieu, Ibn Batuta, and Tahtawi, among 
others, Still, the main purpose of the book is the exploration of certain themes, such as voyages and 
intercultural encounters, rather than the thorough interpretation of texts. For Euben’s view of Ibn Khaldun, 
see Euben, 2006: 75, 113. 
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of both understandings. In deference to the theme of this journal, I will devote somewhat 
more time to Ibn Khaldun.2 
 
2. Hobbes and Ibn Khaldun on Life without Political Authority 
Both Hobbes and Ibn Khaldun consider the pre-political state intolerable, on account of 
the absence of a commonly accepted authority to curb the actions that often follow from 
natural human passions. As Hobbes puts it “men have no pleasure, but on the contrary 
a great deal of grief, in keeping company when there is no power able to overawe them 
all” (Hobbes, 1994: 75). Ibn Khaldun weighs in:  
 
There needs to be something else that protects [human beings] from each other’s 
aggression…and this restraint will be one of them, who will have over them 
domination, control, and a strong hand, so that they do not commit aggressive acts 
against one another (Ibn Khaldun, 2005: 1.69).3 
 
The need to subdue human excess by means of overpowering political authority is keenly 
felt by both thinkers, and expressed in eloquent, unambiguous terms. 
 
The two thinkers also display considerable agreement on the character of the actions 
that need to be restrained. For Hobbes, men in the state of nature “endeavor to destroy 
or subdue one another” Hobbes, 1994: 75), the result being a “time of war, where every 
man is enemy to every man” (Hobbes, 1994: 76). Ibn Khaldun speaks of “injustice and 
mutual aggression…leading to tumult, bloodshed, and death,” which arises when one 
person lays his hand on the property on another, and the other person angrily seeks 
revenge (Ibn Khaldun, 2005: 1.321). Both thinkers believe that life without political 
authority exposes humans to so much violent death as to put the well-being or even 
survival of the species into question. 
 
While Ibn Khaldun’s prognosis for our pre-political state is nearly as gloomy as 
Hobbes’s, he nevertheless lends greater weight to natural human sociability. Hobbes 
argues that “nature…dissociates” man, so that our disruptive, unsocial passions should 
be viewed as part of “man’s nature” and therefore beyond sin (Hobbes, 1994: 76-77). In 
                                                 
2 The best extant comparison between Ibn Khaldun and Hobbes may occur in Abdessalam Cheddadi’s 
magisterial book on Ibn Khaldun (Cheddadi 2006: 493-96). In attempting to prove how remote Ibn Khaldun 
is from modern European thought, Cheddadi provides a strong summary of the differences between the two 
thinkers but downplays their similarities. 
3 All translations from Ibn Khaldun are my own. 
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implied contradiction to Aristotle, Hobbes does not place humans among the more 
sociable types of animals, such as bees and ants, on the grounds that humans do not 
naturally agree about whom should rule them and are unique in their tendency to engage 
in destructive quarrels with members of their own species (Hobbes, 1994: 96, 108). 
Many of the disruptive passions that Hobbes so brilliantly discusses, such as vainglory, 
are quintessentially human (Hobbes, 1994: 75-76). Animals have no role whatsoever in 
Hobbes’s account of the state of nature, as if the anarchy that pervades it is caused by 
human behavior alone. Ibn Khaldun also emphasizes the destructiveness of human 
passions, but classifies them as part of our “animal nature of injustice and aggression” 
(Ibn Khaldun, 2005: 1.321, cf. 1.69). While Ibn Khaldun does not appear to believe that 
the animal part of our nature can be completely overcome, his association of injustice 
and aggression with it alone leaves the door open for a more sociable, human part of 
our nature as well.4 
  
This disagreement between the two thinkers concerning natural human sociability is 
reflected in their descriptions of the pre-political state. Hobbes’s state of nature has “no 
arts…[and] no society” whatsoever, and only a very primitive form of social organization, 
such as “small families” (Hobbes, 1994: 76-77). Ibn Khaldun does not go so far. He does 
not so much reject the claim, inherited from Aristotle, that “humans are political by 
nature,” as reinterpret it to mean that not political authority as such, but “human society 
(ijtima‘) is necessary.” Human society, in turn, is equated with both cities and settlement 
(‘umran).5 The distinction between city, society, and settlement is clearly and consciously 
blurred (Ibn Khaldun, 2005: 1.69). And while Ibn Khaldun agrees with Aristotle about 
the need for some sort of cooperation, he departs starkly from both Aristotle and his 
Muslim successor Alfarabi in tracing this need to reasons that are not moral but purely 
physical (Ibn Khaldun, 2005: 1.67-68).6 Ibn Khaldun’s reasoning on the physical need 
                                                 
44 Ernst Gellner argues bluntly that “Ibn Khaldun knew full well that the state of nature is not individualistic, 
but tribal,” with the context indicating that the mistaken individualist is Hobbes (Gellner 1981: 24). This 
overstatement nonetheless has the virtue of bringing the difference between our two thinkers into focus. 
5 An in-depth discussion of the meaning of this term, whose root essentially means “living” and which might 
also be translated as “culture” or “civilization,” lies beyond the scope of this article. Luckily, Waseem al-Rayes 
has written a deeper exploration of its meaning and significance. Note especially the definition of the term (El-
Rayes, 2013, 211 ff.) and the author’s conclusion: “In establishing a standard for how individuals and nations 
ought to live, one must fully understand how nations and individuals actually live.” El-Rayes, 2013: 225. 
6 As Charles Butterworth puts it, “Ibn Khaldun’s recognition of the simple truth that ‘the human being is 
political by nature’ leads to no reflections about human perfection or how it is attained” (Butterworth, 2004: 
454). Even if we may safely assume that Ibn Khaldun had no access to Aristotle’s Politics, he would certainly 
have been familiar with the work of Alfarabi, who thought that humans must enter ijtima‘ not only for fulfilling 
physical needs, but for pursuing virtuous (afḍal) ends as well (Alfarabi, 1993: 69, Alfarabi, 1985: 229). 
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for society is relatively straightforward. Humans need to produce enough food to live on 
and enough weapons to protect themselves from the depredations of the numerous 
species of wild beasts that are bigger, stronger, and sturdier than they are. Only by 
pooling their built-in advantages, namely the art (sina‘a) of the hand and thought of the 
mind, can humans hope to accomplish these goals (Ibn Khaldun, 2005: 1.68). As a result, 
even the pre-political state involves a fair amount of cooperation, civilization, and art. 
The “aggression and injustice” that renders this state so miserable is said to occur “after 
society has arisen among humans, as we have set down, and the settlement of the world 
has been completed” (Ibn Khaldun, 2005: 1.69). Ibn Khaldun evidently does not believe 
that art and reason alone can induce humans to curb the brutish part of their nature, in 
the absence of a coercive political authority. If anything, art alone appears to worsen the 
disorder, by introducing dangerous new weapons while overcoming the poverty and 
physical necessity that tend to keep human passions under wraps (Mahdi, 1957: 188-
89). The pre-political state may not be as primitive as Hobbes’s state of nature, but it 
remains subject to intolerable outbreaks of violence. The need for a powerful sovereign 
therefore appears as urgent to Ibn Khaldun as it does to Hobbes. 
 
3. Hobbes and Ibn Khaldun on Families and Politics 
The path from the insecure isolation of the pre-political state to life in highly organized 
society would seem to run through smaller, sub-political forms of association, such as 
the family. Both Hobbes and Ibn Khaldun agree that families of some sort exist in our 
pre-political state, but they differ somewhat with regard to their character and authority. 
These differences will ultimately inform their respective understandings of the origin of 
political society. 
 
Hobbes’s most thematic statement on the family occurs in his discussion of paternal 
power. In a state of pure nature, this power has no basis other than the nebulous “natural 
inclination” of sex and procreation (Hobbes, 1994: 129). In keeping with this 
assessment, Hobbes invokes the families that are said to exist in a state of near nature 
in many parts of America, held together only by “natural lust,” and living in the “brutish 
manner” of a state of nature devoid of both society and art (Hobbes, 1994: 76-77). 
Hobbes later speaks of another, somewhat stronger type of pre-political family, which 
possesses some form of art and property, including “instruments of husbandry.” Subject 
only to certain “laws of honor” rather than “the laws of nature” on which political society 
is founded, the people living in small families view piracy and theft as profitable 
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occupations (Hobbes, 1994: 106-07). The ties that bind families are neither tight 
enough nor broad enough to become an effective political force. 
 
Hobbes makes certain comparisons between kingdoms and families: none of them, 
however, suggest genuine equivalence. He describes kingdoms as “greater families,” but 
the context concerns external war, not internal peace. Just as rival kingdoms will 
inevitably settle their differences on the field of battle, so will feuding families (Hobbes, 
1994: 107). But only the state offers adequate protection in such situations. The family, 
no matter how large or well-governed by its chief, would be less likely than the kingdom 
to survive in combat without suffering intolerable losses. On this point, Hobbes does not 
appear to distinguish between a family, clan, or tribe. Institutions based on common 
blood could at best temper the battle of all against all that consumes the state of nature 
by redefining it as the battle of family against family. But since the latter is likely to be 
nearly as destructive as the former, no one could prudently rely on his family alone for 
protection. Hobbes therefore argues that all family ties are dissolved by armed conflicts, 
in which every person has the right to look out for his own safety, even if that means 
betraying his family (Hobbes, 1994: 132). The only exception, illustrated more clearly in 
De Cive than in Leviathan, is when a family acquires enough servants to become a 
commonwealth on its own, but this follows at least as much from success in battle as 
from natural fertility (Hobbes 1991, 217, cf. Hobbes 1994, 132). The members of this 
family-turned-commonwealth are no longer linked primarily by blood ties. 
 
Ibn Khaldun’s initial description of the pre-political condition does not explicitly mention 
the family. But since it treats the emergence of society and settlement as necessary, one 
wonders whether humans could ever unite on so large a scale without first uniting in 
families. This question is gradually answered in subsequent accounts of the formation 
of government. The development of society and settlement of the world leave human 
beings at an impasse. Their original motives for cooperation, namely nourishment and 
protection against animals, are insufficient to protect them against the aggressiveness 
and injustice arising from the bestial nature of their own species. This nature can be 
curbed only by a human who restrains them (wazi‘), but Ibn Khaldun does not 
immediately elucidate how such a human comes into being and seizes control. He offers 
only a small hint, by introducing a somewhat mysterious quality called asabiyya, which 
apparently does more than prophecy and divine law to reduce human beings to 
obedience (Ibn Khaldun, 2005: 1.70). It is only in the subsequent discussion of asabiyya 
later in the work that the significance of families, clans, and tribes becomes evident. 
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In introducing his first lengthy treatment of asabiyya, Ibn Khaldun explains how the 
injustice and aggressiveness inherent in animal nature may be counteracted by qualities 
existing only in “human natures,” such as zeal and compassion for one’s own (Ibn 
Khaldun, 2005: 1.206). These elements of human psychology do not so much mitigate 
as respond to animal aggressiveness: when an injustice is committed against a close 
relation, humans have always had a natural inclination to come to defense of the victim 
(Ibn Khaldun, 2005: 1.207). It is through this mixture of compassion and righteous 
indignation that “mutual help and assistance will emerge,” filling their enemies with fear 
(Ibn Khaldun, 2005: 1.206). As various individuals and groups exchange grievances, a 
cycle of vengeance develops, so that war arising mainly from asabiyya is a natural and 
inextricable part of human life (Ibn Khaldun, 2005: 2.55). Although asabiyya animates 
war in between groups, it provides solidarity within them, and thus representing a crucial 
component of the wazi‘ that humans need (Ibn Khaldun, 2005: 1.206, see Jabiri, 1979: 
245-49). 
 
The extent and authority of any given asabiyya depends on the breadth and depth of the 
human sympathy that generates it. Ibn Khaldun is quite sure that such sympathy does 
not extend to all humankind, but only to the small group with whom each person is 
familiar. Ibn Khaldun begins by identifying its objects as the family, mentioning only 
“kindred” (dhu arham) and “relatives” (qurba’). Yet the Qur’anic example that he urges 
his readers to consider does not unambiguously uphold this assertion. Yusuf’s brothers 
assure their father Yaqub that they will guard Joseph from harm, since their entire family 
group (‘uṣba) would suffer if he were eaten by a wolf (Ibn Khaldun, 2005: 1.206, Qur’an, 
12.14). Ibn Khaldun must have known, along with all of his Muslim, Jewish, and Christian 
readers, the flagrant mendacity of this promise, since the brothers were already 
scheming to throw Yusuf into a well (Qur’an, 12.14). Ibn Khaldun thus tacitly undermines 
his initial claim about the solidarity of the family unit. He implies that family members 
often hate one another, a fact of life to which no persuasive theory of asabiyya can be 
oblivious. As Ibn Khaldun notes elsewhere, the human need for cooperation gives rise 
to quarrels as well as friendships on both the individual, tribal, and national level (Ibn 
Khaldun, 2005: 2.55, 2.341). He also suggests that families may be too small to 
guarantee protection against wolves, let alone human predators. The example of large-
scale war that immediately follows the citation of Yusuf finds an unconscious echo in 
Hobbes: both an individual and small family will be tempted to flee a pitched battle 
involving whole nations due to their small chance of escaping its perils by other means 
(Ibn Khaldun, 2005: 1.206, Hobbes, 1994: 132). An asabiyya stronger than that of a 
mere family is therefore required for consistent military success. While the central role 
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played by asabiyya introduces a dimension to Ibn Khaldun’s argument that is absent in 
Hobbes’s, on the level of a small family the two thinkers do not greatly diverge. Neither 
regards this primitive institution as capable of building a larger society or settling violent 
disputes. 
 
The example of the family is nevertheless not put forth in vain. The passions discussed 
in conjunction with it remain the key to the establishment of large-scale political society, 
as becomes clear in the next section, where Ibn Khaldun expands his discussion of 
asabiyya well beyond the family. He traces the primordial inclination to defend our 
friends from injustice and aggressiveness to “close contact” (iltiham, lahma), and 
proceeds to define this contact, as well as kinship (nasab), in a broad way that includes 
neighbors, partners in oaths, and clients as well as family members (Ibn Khaldun, 2005: 
1.207-08). Mutual affinity and concern between humans are consolidated not by half-
forgotten blood ties or imaginary genealogies, which may stretch back generations 
without having any clear relation to contemporary reality, but by continuous social 
interaction in life-and-death matters among larger human groups (Ibn Khaldun, 2005: 
1.208, 1.314).7 Unlike Yaqub’s fractious clan, but quite like his large tribe of 
descendants, groups formed in this way may become large enough to both fend off 
enemies and overcome inevitable rivalries and disputes among individual members. 
Natural human sociability leads, over long periods of intimacy, to the consolidation of 
tribal groups. A select few of them become powerful enough to acquire royal authority, 
which will be considered in the next section. 
 
In Ibn Khaldun, primordial human sociability gives rise to arts and settled life, but does 
not induce the mutual support and defense necessary for strong political society. These 
bonds are eventually forged, but only by close and prolonged social experience and 
interaction. In Hobbes, no amount of shared experience or interaction can make a social 
animal out of one that is so fundamentally unsocial to begin with. Familiarity over time 
does nothing to temper the deep mutual distrust that prevents enduring human 
partnerships from forming. The escape from the state of nature requires not gradual 
evolution but a conscious political decision, which will be considered in the next section. 
 
                                                 
7 As Mahdi puts it, “In time, these latter factors [of common interests and experience] overshadow common 
ancestry” (Mahdi, 1957: 196-97]. Muḥammad Jabiri also perceives the relative insignificance of nasab, 
concluding  “It has now become clear that the true and effective foundation on which asabiyya is built is 
something other than nasab,” and that this other thing must be common interests of some sort (Jabiri, 1979: 
260, see 258-61, 290-91). 
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4. Escape from Chaos: How is Political Society Established? 
Both Hobbes and Ibn Khaldun see the establishment of an unflappable government as 
the best way to escape the perils of our pre-political state. Called “sovereign power” or 
“Leviathan” by Hobbes (Hobbes, 1994: 109) and “royal authority” by Ibn Khaldun (mulk, 
Ibn Khaldun, 2005: 69), this government is vested by both thinkers with as much 
authority as is needed to restrain disruptive human passions. While examining the 
precise arrangement of this government in each thinker lies beyond the scope of this 
article, reflecting on the peculiar way in which each understands its establishment can 
shed light on the view of politics characteristic of each thinker. 
 
We return now to the fundamental question of natural human sociability. It is deemed to 
be so lacking by Hobbes, that no natural process suffices to create it. If left to their own 
devices, humans will continue to quarrel endlessly with one another. As Hobbes put it, 
somewhat paradoxically, the very “laws of nature” that command us to seek equity and 
peace “are contrary to our natural passions, that carry us to partially, pride, revenge, and 
the like” (Hobbes, 1994: 106). The “great Leviathan…to which we owe…our peace and 
defense” (Hobbes, 1994: 109) by enforcing the laws of nature is itself described as 
“artificial,” as is the covenant that creates it (Hobbes, 1994: 3, 109). The Leviathan can 
only come into a being through human art and resolve. The decision to erect it is inspired 
less by courage or calculation than by fear: the violence of the state of nature must 
become so unbearable that humans agree to submit to a person or assembly who 
promises to put an end to it, Quite frequently, this person to whom they willingly submit 
for the sake of security is in fact their conqueror: 
 
And this kind of dominion or sovereignty [by acquisition] different from dominion or 
sovereignty by institution only in this, that man who choose their sovereign do it for fear of 
one another, not of him whom they institute. But in this case they subject themselves to 
him whom they are afraid of. In both cases they do it for fear. (Hobbes, 1994: 127) 
 
The fearfulness of weak individuals, rather than the organic growth of any ruling group, 
is that main motive driving the decision to erect a commonwealth (Hobbes, 1994: 88, 
Hobbes, 1991: 113). 
 
Ibn Khaldun accepts, in a somewhat novel way, the old premise that “humans are political 
by nature.” Political society may not arise immediately and in all situations, but it does 
appear to emerge naturally. By associating with one another, humans divide over time 
into clans and groups, each held together by its common asabiyya. The number of such 
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groups is vast, with multiple ‘asabiyyat coexisting uneasily within every tribe. The size 
and strength of asabiyya in each group is also bound to vary considerably. While the 
weaker forms of asabiyya may not extend beyond a single household, the stronger forms 
establish a close-knit solidarity among a larger group. In certain cases, it becomes 
powerful enough to win over the rest of the tribe, resulting in rulership over them (Ibn 
Khaldun, 2005: 1.213). In rarer cases, it attains enough force to subdue other nations 
as well, resulting in royal authority. Ibn Khaldun praises royal authority as the ultimate 
goal of asabiyya, and the only hope to unifying a large number of people in political 
society (Ibn Khaldun, 2005: 1.226-27).8 It is perhaps in light of these considerations 
that Ibn Khaldun eventually defines royal authority not as an artificial construct, but as 
“an office natural to humans” (Ibn Khaldun, 2005: 1.321). In its absence, the various 
clannish and tribal rulerships will battle for power, in something resembling a continual 
state of war (Ibn Khaldun, 2005: 2.55, Mahdi, M., 1957: 198). Of course, even the power 
of kings has its limits. Kings will continue to wage wars against their rivals, expanding 
their domains either until their own resources are overstretched (Ibn Khaldun, 2005: 
1.227, 273-76), or until they come up against another king equal or greater in authority 
(Ibn Khaldun, 2005, 2.17). The perpetual state of war between rival kingdoms is as 
inextricable a feature of Ibn Khaldun’s understanding of politics as it is of Hobbes’s 
(Muqaddima, 3.37, Hobbes, 1994: 78, 107). Both Hobbes and Ibn Khaldun agree that 
even though royal authority promises neither universality nor peace, the larger and more 
lasting governments established by it shelter human civilization, permitting it to flourish 
in a way that weaker forms of authority do not (Ibn Khaldun, 2005: 2.111, Hobbes, 1994: 
78). According to Ibn Khaldun’s memorable formulation, royal authority is the form that 
protects the matter of ‘umran (Ibn Khaldun, 2005: 2.233), while according to Hobbes, 
healthy competition among large kingdoms is the best way to “uphold…the industry of 
their subjects” (Hobbes, 1994: 78). 
 
Both Hobbes and Ibn Khaldun emphasize the sovereign’s great power and authority, yet 
only Hobbes emphasizes the role of consent in its formation. According to Hobbes, a 
“multitude of men…must agree and covenant” to erect a commonwealth and sovereign 
power (Hobbes, 1994: 110). Since Hobbes later acknowledges that fear of violence, at 
the hands of either the presumptive sovereign or quarrelsome neighbors, plays a vital 
role in inducing this consent (Hobbes, 1994: 127), he is not so naive as to think that any 
people would establish a government entirely without constraint. Be this as it may, the 
                                                 
8 Mahdi explains: “The solidarity that proves itself in war becomes the source of the various types of civilized 
rule” Mahdi, 1957: 263 
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lip service that Hobbes pays to the consent of the ruled in the midst of fear remains 
highly significant, as it establishes a principle that would shape emerging democratic 
attitudes toward politics. No such rhetoric exists in Ibn Khaldun, for whom the 
acquisition of royal authority requires total defeat of rivals, and the preservation of it the 
total domination of them (Ibn Khaldun, 2005: 1.226, 1.259). The term used by Ibn 
Khaldun to describe this power, taghalub, had been used by Alfarabi to render the Greek 
term tyrannos, connoting the worst kind of regime (Alfarabi, 1993: 94 ff.). So while 
Hobbes attempts to whitewash the sovereign’s power, or at least the manner in which it 
is set up, Ibn Khaldun paints it in the brightest of colors, in a way that would have been 
quite shocking to readers familiar with earlier Muslim political philosophy. 
 
For Hobbes, individuals consent, usually out of fear, to the rule of the sovereign, for the 
sake of their comfort and preservation; for Ibn Khaldun, clans and tribes yield to royal 
authority only once they have been soundly defeated. The result is in both cases quite 
similar, namely, a ruler who possesses the overwhelming power necessary to guarantee 
security and prosperity. Yet the process by which the result is obtained already implies 
certain differences in the duties of subjects and longevity of government, to which I will 
now turn. 
 
5. Stability and Obedience in Ibn Khaldun and Hobbes 
Hobbes’s Leviathan is an artificial entity established by a collective decision of 
individuals; Ibn Khaldun’s royal authority is a natural institution that coalesces due to 
the overwhelming might of one group. It might seem as if the mutual cooperation 
inspired by asabiyya would provide stickier glue for the state than tepid individuals, yet 
the opposite is ultimately the case. While authority rooted in asabiyya may be stronger 
at first, it unravels much more quickly, leading to the inevitable decline of the dynasty. 
  
The Leviathan is meant to endure. Hobbes does not set any limit on the longevity of 
commonwealths, suggesting that one constructed on the solid foundation of scientific 
rules and a proper understanding of the duties of both ruler and subjects could last a 
very long time (Hobbes, 1994: 135, 221). Hobbes later cautions that all things made by 
men must perish, but hopes that a commonwealth ably constructed according to rational 
principles could at least preserve itself against death from “internal diseases” (Hobbes, 
1994: 210), although not necessarily against death from “external violence” (Hobbes, 
1994: 218-19, 221). The patient, fearful consent to power that Hobbes demands of 
subjects will pay off in the form of long term stability and prosperity.     
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Ibn Khaldun is able to promise no such thing. He glorifies the initial strength of royal 
authority, only to display its subsequent fragility. It is no different from other human 
and natural things, all of which are subject to the law of generation and decline (Ibn 
Khaldun, 2005: 1.221, 287-89). The inevitable ebb and flow of politics follows from the 
uneasy relationship between royal authority and asabiyya. No sooner has asabiyya 
attained its ultimate end of royal authority, than it gradually begins to dissipate. Large 
sections of the Muqaddima are devoted to specifying the causes of this inexorable 
decline. To make a long story short, the great effort required to exert royal authority, or 
the rule of the weak many by the powerful few, cannot be sustained in the long haul. 
The fact that one person must ultimately seize royal authority and consolidate its power 
and glory for himself alone drives a wedge between the ruler and his ambitious followers, 
forcing him to crush the asabiyya that brought him to power and rely on less devoted 
clients (Ibn Khaldun, 2005: 281-83). Meanwhile, enjoyment of the resources conferred 
by royal authority breeds luxury and complacency among the ruling class, depriving 
them of the spirited, martial qualities that once made them so fearsome (Ibn Khaldun, 
2005: 1.284-86). The dynasty passes through five stages, beginning with strength and 
ending in senility (Ibn Khaldun, 2005: 1.296-98). Subjects may continue to obey the 
dynasty out of habit, but such a reflex cannot last forever (Ibn Khaldun, 1.261). There 
are various ways to temper or postpone this decline, such as employing competent 
clients in the service of the dynasty after the initial asabiyya has faded, but devices of 
this sort will merely delay the inevitable (Ibn Khaldun, 2005: 1.219). As Ibn Khaldun 
eloquently puts it, “Senility is chronic disease that cannot be cured or removed, because 
it is natural, and natural matters do not change” (Muqaddima, Ibn Khaldun, 2005: 2.92). 
While Hobbes’s acknowledgement that all things made by man must end feels 
perfunctory, for Ibn Khaldun it is fundamental to his understanding of government. 
 
In Ibn Khaldun’s understanding, royal authority as such is necessary for civilization, but 
no particular dynasty appears to be. Indeed, since the eventual senility of any given 
dynasty is inevitable, the best outcome is for a fresh asabiyya to emerge somewhere in 
the empire, forming the backbone of a new dynasty that overthrows the old. Royal 
authority is thereby not destroyed, but rejuvenated: indeed, it cannot flourish for more 
than a few generations without being periodically refreshed in this way. Many nations 
(umam), including the Arabs, Persians, and Greeks, successfully maintain their royal 
authority for centuries by permitting it to pass to another tribe (sha‘b) among them 
whenever a given dynasty becomes senile (Ibn Khaldun, 2005: 1.239-41). To illustrate 
what happens when a people no longer enjoys enough asabiyya to replace senile 
dynasties, Ibn Khaldun points repeatedly to the greatest Muslim disaster of his era, 
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namely the inexorable decline of al-Andalus. Bereft of asabiyya after centuries of 
government and civilization, the Andalusians became easy prey to the Christian 
reconquest (Ibn Khaldun, 2005: 1.218, 243, 260). 
 
The obligation of obedience to the state is clearly linked to its longevity. Commandments 
inscribed in bronze tend to inspire greater awe than those jotted down on tea leaves. 
Even Hobbes, known for equating justice with obedience to the government and laws, 
suggests that subjects no longer have to obey a sovereign that has ceased to offer them 
protection (Hobbes, 1994: 219). But in a Leviathan that resembles a well-built house in 
avoiding all of the structural errors that might weaken it, such a situation would arise 
only in the case of foreign conquest (Hobbes, 1994: 221). Hobbes is therefore famously 
dismissive of certain Greco-Romain attitudes that justify rebellion in the name of liberty 
(Hobbes, 1994: 140-41, 214-15), and certain Christian attitudes that justify rebellion in 
the name of the other life (Hobbes, 1994: 92). In the thought of Ibn Khaldun, dynasties 
are altogether less stable. The balance of power of the various ‘asabiyyat is constantly 
in flux, and the decline of all ruling dynasties inevitable. This consideration informs Ibn 
Khaldun’s spirited, but qualified, defense of royal authority. He rejects the doctrines of 
groups such as the Kharijites, who denounce royal authority as contrary to Islam, 
retorting that royal authority and the asabiyya that underpin it are indispensable for 
effectively upholding the shari‘a (Ibn Khaldun, 2005: 1.330-31). He has nothing but 
contempt for most of the rebels who pretend to be the expected Fatimid of Islamic lore, 
and devotes an inordinately long chapter to debunking the traditions that predict the 
appearance of this legendary figure (Ibn Khaldun, 2005: 1.272, cf. 2.124-48 ). But Ibn 
Khaldun never goes so far as to say that rebellion as such is wrong. He mocks the 
impostors not for the rebelliousness of their actions, but for their futility, reminding his 
readers yet again that no political enterprise can succeed without asabiyya (Ibn Khaldun, 
2005: 1.270, 272, 2.145). Religious rebels who do obtain the support of ‘asabiyya, such 
as the Almohads, enjoy the greatest chance of success, and are not necessarily to be 
blamed for their actions (Ibn Khaldun, 2005: 1.268). The model (imam) followed 
throughout the work is not royal authority, but asabiyya, without which neither royal 
authority, nor prophecy, nor religious propaganda of any sort (da‘wa) can attain its ends 
(Ibn Khaldun, 2005: 1.206). If the most important political motto for Hobbes is “obey 
the sovereign” (Hobbes, 1994: 110-11), the parallel motto for Ibn Khaldun would be 
“consider asabiyya,” something that many enthusiastic but doomed rebels have utterly 
failed to do (Ibn Khaldun, 2005: 1.272). 
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We are now in a position to understand the difference between Ibn Khaldun and Hobbes. 
Ibn Khaldun establishes no general rule against rebellion, since successful uprisings that 
replace senile old dynasties with vigorous new ones are indispensable for the long-term 
health of royal authority. No assessment of any particular rebellion can be made without 
considering both the relative strength of the rebels’ asabiyya and the relative senility of 
the dynasty they seek to overthrow (see Jabari, 1979: 291). Hobbes is much more willing 
than Ibn Khaldun to make an a priori judgment against rebellion as such, since in his 
view no well-constructed state should ever become senile. 
 
6. Conclusion: Dynasty versus State 
The Arabic term dawla has become the modern word for ‘state.’ It is also a common 
word in Ibn Khaldun, which Franz Rosenthal translates quite sensibly as “dynasty.” I have 
followed Rosenthal in employing this translation throughout the article. While the 
Leviathan may be seen as the precursor of the modern state, it is harder to view Ibn 
Khaldun’s dawla in that light. The original classical Arabic meaning of dawla is not 
“state,” but “turn, mutation, change, or vicissitude” (Lane, 1867: vol. 3, 934). The term 
is often used to signify historical shifts: the Umayyad dawla had its turn, as did its 
Abbasid successor. The English term “state,” in contrast, is derived from a Latin root that 
means “stand.”9 It is meant to be impersonal, neutral, and enduring, like the Leviathan 
that Hobbes attempts to construct. Ibn Khaldun’s dawla remains far closer to the 
classical Arabic meaning of the term. It is impermanent and constantly in motion, as 
various ‘asabiyyat strengthen and diminish, as well as profoundly personal and partisan, 
being held by one person in the name of a group and dedicated, when strong, to 
preserving the power and interests of that person and group. In Ibn Khaldun’s view, 
effective politics requires overwhelming power, without the niceties of legal mechanisms 
or public consent. In this respect, his political conclusions offer some support to the 
largely despotic empires that prevailed in his time. These empires will, of course, become 
senile, only to be replaced by other empires much of the same kind. Unlike his 
predecessors Alfarabi and Averroes,10 Ibn Khaldun does not even mention regimes such 
as oligarchy or democracy, inherited from Greek sources but of questionable relevance 
                                                 
9 For a concise explanation, see the subheading ‘origin’ at https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/ definition/state. 
“Middle English (as a noun): partly a shortening of estate, partly from Latin status ‘manner of standing, 
condition’ (see status). The current verb senses date from the mid 17th century.” 
10 See Alfarabi, 1993: 87-103 and Averroes, 1974: 105-45. Averroes does attempt to classify contemporary 
governments according to a Platonic framework (Averroes, 1974: 121, 125, 133), but Ibn Khaldun abandons 
this effort.  
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to Muslim historical reality. Looking neither backward toward antiquity or forward 
toward modernity, Ibn Khaldun’s political thought appears deeply rooted in the medieval 
Islamic present. This helps to explain why many scholars regard his outlook as 
fundamentally conservative.11 
 
Ibn Khaldun’s account of the origin, flourishing, and decline of medieval Muslim 
governments remains unequalled to this day. Still, his focus on the politics of his own 
time poses challenges for those who seek to apply his theories to ours. The dynastic 
system described by Ibn Khaldun persevered for many centuries after his death, but by 
1917 it had finally collapsed under the stress of both European colonialism and ethnic 
nationalism. The new states that emerged from its ashes are for the most part neither 
dynastic nor imperial in the traditional sense, and they are influenced, to varying 
degrees, by modern political ideas such as democracy and nationalism, which were 
unknown to Ibn Khaldun. 
 
Hobbes, like Ibn Khaldun, is a defender of monarchy. At the same time, he developed an 
impersonal view of government that is more appealing to modern ears. The Hobbesian 
language of consent, laws, rights, public order, and was adopted by influential disciples 
of Hobbes such as Locke and Spinoza, and continues to pervade both political theory 
and practice today. If there were in fact a debate between Ibn Khaldun, one might be 
tempted to say that Hobbes has won it.  
 
I would reply that the debate is in fact far from settled. The dramatic changes that have 
shook the Middle East and North Africa in modern times have in no way ousted Ibn 
Khaldun from his position as an outstanding political guide to the region. His description 
of politics as competition between groups, and the need for one group to prevail for the 
sake of stability, remains a very plausible explanation of several of its current regimes, 
regardless of whether the victorious group is the Alawites in Syria, the House of Saud in 
Saudi Arabia, the clergy in Iran, or the officer corps in Algeria and Egypt. 
 
                                                 
11 See El-Rayes, 2015: 226, 247 as well as For the classic statement of this aspect of Ibn Khaldun, see Gibb, 
1933: 27, who says that Ibn Khaldun “never puts forward suggestions for the reform of the institutions which 
he describes so minutely, nor considers the possibility that they may be modified as the result of human effort 
and thought, but accepts the facts as they are and presents the cycle of states and dynasties as an inevitable 
and almost mechanical process.” More recently, Ernst Gellner has concluded: “[Ibn Khaldun] wastes little time 
on moralizing. He tells us what political authority is, gives its natural history, and there’s the end of it” (Gellner 
1981: 30). 
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It would be equally wrong to dismiss Ibn Khaldun as antiquated in light of modern  
politics more generally. As he himself observes, the phenomenon of asabiyya is altered 
in an urban environment, but it does not vanish. Since extended clans no longer dwell 
together and the significance of ancestry becomes either weakened or blurred (Ibn 
Khaldun, 2005: 1.217), urban asabiyya tends to depend more on marital alliances and 
personal acquaintances. Still, it is strong enough to seize control of the government 
whenever a power vacuum occurs (Ibn Khaldun, 2005: 2.237-39). The influence of family 
and personal acquaintance on politics endures, even in modern democracies, where 
patronage is part and parcel of all political systems, at the local and even national level. 
Urban politics in America are frequently controlled by so-called political machines, and 
the benefits they distribute to friends and supporters: the Daley machine in Chicago was 
notorious, and not simply in a bad way, for keeping order and getting things done. Nor 
is national politics free from family intrigue. Bill Clinton sought to install his wife in the 
Oval Office, while Donald Trump keeps his son-in-law as a chief advisor, and is 
frequented suspected of advancing his family business interests. Of course, both have 
encountered democratic resistance, in the form of an electoral and judicial system that 
aims to guarantee impersonal fairness: Bill Clinton’s enterprise failed, and Donald Trump 
remains, in this respect and others, controversial. Still, does anyone expect family 
appointments and patronage networks to disappear completely from any country on 
earth?  
 
Ibn Khaldun also observed that merchants and other wealthy individuals need to either 
make use of the ruling asabiyya or develop some form of asabiyya of their own, in order 
to defend themselves and their fortune against the depredations of rulers (Ibn Khaldun, 
2005: 2.221). This suggests that with the dispersal of the old tribal clans and flourishing 
of trades, guilds, and merchants in an urban setting, moneyed or professional groups 
may begin to develop a certain asabiyya of their own, based on shared interest and 
acquaintance.12 In modern democracies, this has evolved into what Americans call 
‘special interests.’ The negative connotations of this term reflect the American belief 
that the government should be as neutral as possible, acting in the service of all the 
people rather than a particular faction thereof. In Federalist 10, Madison argues that “the 
regulation of…various and interfering interests forms the principle task of modern 
legislation” (Madison, 1973: 90). But we should not summarily dismiss Ibn Khaldun’s 
                                                 
12 Mahdi suggests that city dwellers eventually “tend to group themselves according to their political and 
economic interests rather than their blood relations” (Mahdi, 1957: 214). 
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view that government can never be simply benevolent or disinterested, since the people 
who run it are always tempted to pursue the interests of their particular group.  
 
I conclude: To assert that the dynastic form of government described by Ibn Khaldun 
has become obsolete may be plausible, but to claim that the political and social 
phenomena which underlie it have disappeared would be absurd. As long as family 
connections, personal acquaintance, and ‘special interests’ continue to play a role in 
politics, Ibn Khaldun’s exploration of them remains essential reading. Modern 
government appears destined to combine the rule of law, neutrality, and popular consent 
favored by Hobbes and his successors with the power, patronage, and asabiyya 
described so brilliantly by Ibn Khaldun. 
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